A golden rule of geopolitics is that wars can often turn great rivals into close allies. The alliance between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union during the Second World War is one such example: a great imperial power of the 19th century, a new world power in the Western Hemisphere and a totalitarian communist state, all brought together to defeat Nazi Germany.
The Grand Alliance was undoubtedly an uneasy one, but its protagonists had many reasons to maintain their relationship and continue cooperation until the end of the war – and beyond. Between Soviet manpower, US armaments and British resolve, from 1941 onwards the Allies recognised that their alliance was necessary to defeat Germany, Italy and Japan, avoiding any temptation to agree a separate peace with the Axis Powers.
As the war came to an end in 1945, both sides still shared several common interests. The Soviets, ravaged by nearly four years of bloody combat against Germany since June 1941, would view a continued supply of US goods to be an important tool for its post-war reconstruction, whilst hoping that US capital would also help to finance the rebuilding of the nation.
From a US perspective, the Soviet market could provide a crucial outlet for American products. With the great economies of Europe and Asia in ruins, real GDP in the US soared by 72% between 1940 and 1945, with the US accounting for more than 50% of global GDP.
Government officials and business leaders in the US believed that the looming problem of overproduction (as the US war economy scaled down) could be eased by selling goods to the Soviets. Economically speaking, both sides of the Grand Alliance saw an advantage in close cooperation.
But positive US-Soviet relations post-1945 would not just offer economic opportunities in the short term, but also provide a long-term security guarantee. Neither the US nor the Soviet Union wished to become involved in another war in the immediate aftermath of World War Two – and especially not against one another, given the enormous military and economic might both sides held.
But the Grand Alliance collapsed and relations between the West and the Soviets quickly deteriorated after the war. Given there were so many reasons to continue cooperation, the split between the Western Allies and Stalin was both complex and ideological.
Quarrels over Soviet actions in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the question of post-war Germany and reparations for the Soviets, and the removal of Germany as a common enemy after its surrender all contributed to this breakdown. But whilst these fractures emerged in force towards the end of the Second World War, the question of the second front would prove to be a continuous source of tension throughout the war.
The second front
Almost immediately after being drawn together as allies, the opening of a second front in Western Europe dominated discussions between Britain, the US and the Soviets. On 18 July 1941, only weeks after the Germans launched their invasion of the Soviet Union, Stalin asked Churchill to launch two additional fronts: one in France and another in the Arctic.
To the Soviets, the second front had obvious benefits: It would immediately take pressure off the Red Army in Eastern Europe, whilst also splitting German forces across the continent. But for Britain (and later the US, upon joining the war in December 1941), a second front also had clear advantages. It would allow the Western Allies to directly influence affairs on the European continent and prevent Stalin from agreeing a separate peace deal with Germany, as Soviet Russia had done in 1918.
Despite Soviet pressure, a firm commitment for a second front would not come until 1942, when Roosevelt agreed with Molotov in Washington that Britain and the US would launch an invasion of Europe later in the year. This promise was however made on political, and not military, terms. British and American military advisors cautioned that any move in 1942 was too risky, and a plan to land a small contingent of troops in northern France (to test German strength, rather than to establish a foothold) was vetoed by the British.
Churchill pushed for the less risky alternative of an Allied landing in North Africa, which Roosevelt eventually came around to, and in August 1942 Churchill would deliver the news personally to Stalin in Moscow. The dictator was deeply unhappy with the revelation that the second front would be delayed and lost his temper with Churchill, asking whether British soldiers were afraid to fight the Germans. Averell Harriman, diplomat and later US Ambassador to Moscow, recalled the confrontation in stark terms:
“Stalin took issue at every point with bluntness, almost to the point of insult, with such remarks as ‘You can’t win wars if you aren’t willing to take risks’ and ‘You must not be so afraid of the Germans.’ This phase of the discussion ended by Stalin stating abruptly, but with dignity, that he could not force action [by the Allies] but he did not agree with the arguments….”
A memorandum sent by Churchill to Stalin after the meeting reiterates his argument for avoiding a second front in Europe:
“The Germans have enough troops in the West to block us in this narrow peninsula with fortified lines, and would concentrate all their air forces in the West upon it. In the opinion of all the British naval, military and air authorities the operation could only end in disaster.
“Even if the lodgment were made, it would not bring a single division back from Russia. It would also be far more a running sore for us than for the enemy, and would use up wastefully and wantonly the key men and the landing craft required for real action in 1943. This is our settled view.”
Put simply, the Western Allies believed that the logistical challenges of a second front in Europe were too great to overcome in the short term, and doubted whether they had the military capability to pull off a successful landing in France. Stalin was left furious – but would have no choice but to accept the decision.
The soft underbelly
With an immediate second front in Western Europe now off the table, the Western Allies focused their attention for 1942 on North Africa (Operation Torch), where they defeated the German and Italian forces in May 1943 – before launching an invasion of Italy in September. Plans for a second front in Northern France - codenamed ‘Overlord’ - only began to pick up steam in 1944, but even at this stage of the war the question of a second front was hotly disputed.
An alternative proposal, led by American diplomat William Bullitt and supported by Winston Churchill, involved opening a second front in the Balkans as opposed to France and striking at what Churchill called the “soft underbelly” of the Axis powers through Yugoslavia and Greece, alongside the ongoing campaign in Italy.
Supporters of Churchill’s soft underbelly strategy perceived access to the Balkans as a way to pin German resources down and bleed Hitler dry whilst avoiding a riskier confrontation in Western Europe, with Churchill promoting a long-established element of British foreign policy – control of the Mediterranean and British imperial territory in the region.
But the Balkan plan was ultimately opposed by Roosevelt, who was keen to prioritise military considerations over all else and saw a second front in France as a key military objective to ending the war. The second front in Western Europe would finally arrive on 6 June 1944, when the Western Allies landed on the beaches of Normandy.
Worsening relations
Despite the Western Allies eventually opening the second front that Stalin so dearly wanted, the geopolitical implications of the debate over its timing would have profound consequences. Despite Operation Overlord taking place only when the Western Allies deemed the logistical and military position to be suitable, it would come nearly three years after Stalin first called for it.
The delays left the Soviets deeply suspicious about Anglo-American intensions, with Stalin believing that the Western Allies were content to let the war be won through Soviet blood, whilst Britain and America sat on the sidelines and avoided heavy sacrifices.
Despite the Western Allies sending the Soviets over 10 million tonnes of war materiel between June 1941 and June 1944 to support the Red Army, Stalin always remained suspicious that his capitalist allies would try to agree a separate peace with Hitler themselves or abandon the Soviets at the first opportunity – and disagreements over the timing and location of the second front only exacerbated this tension.
However, the delay to the second front was a result of Anglo-American insecurity instead of duplicity. Both Churchill and Roosevelt were keenly aware that they needed Soviet support to defeat Germany, and when D-Day came, only 90 German divisions faced the Western Allies in France and Italy, as opposed to 250 on the Eastern Front. Military and logistical concerns were the key consideration of the Western Allies (especially Roosevelt), but to Stalin, the far greater Soviet burden appeared to be intentionally exacerbated by the Anglo-Americans.
With the Red Army in the ascendency across Eastern Europe, the second front played a political alongside a military role, as the issue drove a wedge between the Soviets and the Western Allies throughout the war. Whilst it was certainly not the only issue between the two sides, it would serve as a precursor to the collapse of US, British and Soviet relations post-1945, with lingering suspicions of Anglo-American duplicity remaining a key driver of Soviet foreign policy throughout the early Cold War.